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“One of the activities of the Community shall include… a contribution to… the flowering of the 
cultures of the Member States.”
- Treaty of Rome, Article 3.
“The internet has enabled people to access information in entirely new ways, promising a revolution 
in the production and storage of human knowledge. Yet the most successful industries of the early 
internet, gambling and pornography, seemed to appeal to people’s baser desires.”
- David G. Schwartz, Cutting the Wire: Gambling Prohibition and the Internet
Why would the European Union fundamentally undermine itself? Unity in diversity 
has long been the ideal of the EU, a voluntary association of independent and democratic 
European states in monetary and political union. Often held up as a beacon for other 
regional integration movements to follow, the EU is by no means a wholly peaceable 
organization without disagreement and debate. Often, the principles which the EU was 
found upon clash with the process of creating policy to deal with the reality of intercon-
nected economies in the global world. When the situation also involves the regulation 
of cultural norms and the transnational web of people and funds found on the internet, 
conflict is inevitable.    
Online gaming1, although still a relatively young industry, has proven to be both 
a force of economics to be reckoned with and a cultural flashpoint of no small measure. 
Under the functional terms of the European Union, those who administer online gaming 
sites are considered to be providing a service within the framework of the EU’s com-
mon market. Unlike most areas of common market operation, however, and despite 
the lobbying of interest groups, the EU has taken no action to regulate online gaming at 
the supranational level. In the absence of EU action harmonizing disparate national ap-
proaches to the industry, substantial intra-EU conflict has emerged within the forum of 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The rulings of the ECJ have been slow to surface as 
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concrete policies implemented by EU member states, if they are adopted at all. This active 
dismissal of EU structures, which were formed to better life on the European continent 
and decrease conflict, is peculiar and bears on the larger discussion of European regional 
integration. The “Europeanization” of Europe, or “the emergence and the development 
at the European level of distinct structures of governance” (Cowles, et. al, 2001, p. 1), has 
generated a body of literature attempting to explain why regional development in the EU 
has occurred in the fashion it has. Discussion in academic circles regarding EU policy for-
mation directing discrepant cultural norms of member states, however, has been relatively 
limited. Additionally, there has been little assessment of online gaming, a commercial 
enterprise affecting the global economy that Europe operates in as well as an issue subject 
to cultural debate and “moral” regulation. By examining prominent literature relating to 
European integration as well as those works dealing with cultural regulation with the most 
applicability to the field of online gaming, the need for a synthesis of theories becomes 
clear. Current approaches to European integration theory enfranchise an almost slavish 
adherence to one school of thought or another, a divide most Europeanists are guilty of 
perpetuating. In dealing with the regulatory complications presented by the internet, cur-
rent discourse on the maintenance of cultural diversity becomes alarmingly disconnected 
from the real world. Unless dominant theories of European integration are seen as more 
interrelated than they currently are, theory will not keep up with reality.
An overview of the current regulatory and political situation of online gambling in 
the European Union will first be provided, followed by an examination of prominent 
literature on European integration and structural operation. Special attention will be 
given to work examining cultural regulation within the EU and its relation to the current 
situation of online gaming. The two key mechanisms able to remedy policy discrepancy 
amongst European Union member states—the directive and European Court of Justice 
rulings —will be assessed in the context of how current thought explains their efficacy (or 
lack there of). Throughout this paper, the current approach to theory, where the virtues 
of a given approach are extolled while devaluing or ignoring another, will be argued to 
inhibit comprehensive analysis of how the EU handles the regulation of culture. Theo-
retical shortcomings will be especially clear in the appraisal of how instruments of EU 
governance function in relation to the case of online gaming. Without movement towards 
a blending of theories on European integration, study of cultural policy in the EU will 
remain superficial and uninstructive as to future paths of action. The situation of online 
gaming speaks to this, with serious implications for both broader cultural policy and Eu-
rope’s ability to adapt in a borderless world.  
Betting on the EU: Common Market Regulation and Online Gaming
It is a tenet of democratic theory that a state’s job is to protect public order. Gaming 
has often been cited as a challenge to that order. Historically, “the belief in luck, in chance, 
was seen as an attack on the influence of the church” (Polders, 1997, p.66), and thus im-
moral and dangerous to governments basing their legitimacy on upholding moral rectitude 
and order. At the same time, society has long been ambivalent about gambling, the prohibi-
tion of which, “was often supported by a citizenry who would indulge on the sly and then 
expect the authorities to turn the other way—especially when gambling was undertaken 
just for fun, among friends and acquaintances, or for worthy causes” (Eadington and Cor-
nelius, 1991, p. xxiv). Gaming is an industry in which government policies have long been 
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tied to normative debates about the activity’s effect on individuals and the functioning of 
the state. Law-abiding citizens, the underage and the easily manipulated have at different 
times, in countries around the world, been cited as requiring protection from the dangers 
of gaming. States consequently developed idiosyncratic methods for dealing with perceived 
threats to community morals and providing for their citizenry based on a variety of factors 
dependent upon the state in question. In its interpretation of how best to respect cultural 
diversity among it member states, the European Union has accidentally enfranchised tension 
between the online gaming regulations adopted by individual states and the operation of the 
EU common market. 
It is important to begin discussions of gaming or gambling policy with a clear idea of 
the topic being discussed. Broadly defined, gambling is “an activity in which a person sub-
jects something of value—usually money—to a risk involving a large amount of chance in 
hopes of winning something of greater value, which is usually money” (Thompson, 1997, 
p.1). In most forms of gambling, the outcome is typically known a short period of time after 
the activity commences and the goal is some type of material or monetary gain. Also, as this 
is an investigation of the regulatory practices of online gaming, these activities can and are 
being undertaken on the internet, and are often referred to as remote gaming operations.
Three activities comprise the bulk of online gaming transactions, both in Europe and 
internationally. The most popular of the three (Burmaster, 2005), is the lottery. In this 
activity, individuals typically choose a set of numbers and are awarded winnings based on 
how many match with a randomly generated result (“Glossary: L,” 2006). While the image 
of purchasing a lottery ticket at a local convenience store is envisioned by most Americans, 
online lottery sites are wildly popular internationally and becoming more so. The second 
format online gaming can assume is bookmaking. In this activity, an individual places a 
monetary wager on a given issue which is then “booked” against the odds of that wager 
being correct. People have the ability to bet on practically anything, from which national 
team will win the World Cup to how long a celebrity marriage will last. The third form 
of online gaming is that of casino games, which includes activities such as poker, blackjack 
and roulette. These games are notable in that they often “provide a predictable long-term 
advantage to the casino, or ‘house’, while offering the player the possibility of a large short-
term payout” (“Casino Games,” 2006). With online systems, casino games can be played 
between an individual and a computer or amongst individuals gambling at the same site. 
The online gaming industry in the European Union is approaching annual revenue 
of a billion Euros (Burmaster, 2005) and some 1.5 million Europeans visit online casinos 
every month (“One in Ten,” 2006). The EU common market and its regulations strive to 
eliminate protectionism and unify trade practices amongst EU member states, but online 
gaming has been a strange exception to those rules. In principle, the aims of the common 
market are both agreeable and attractive, but the interests of individual member states have 
been known to intervene and seriously complicate the process of policy harmonization. 
When European governance bodies—the European Parliament, the European Commis-
sion or the EU Council of Ministers—require states to amend their domestic regulations to 
match those decided on at the EU level, a directive is issued. These directives, or “collec-
tive legislative act[s] …which require member states to achieve a particular result without 
dictating the means of achieving that result” (“European Union directive,” 2006), typically 
cover a spectrum of policies relating to a given area, such as the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights across the EU. To date, those directives which could include online gam-
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bling regulation, such as the recent Services Directive (“Position,” 2006), have exempted 
online gambling. In the case of the services directive, inclusion of online gambling became 
entangled with the larger debate of the “country-of-origin” principle, a highly controversial 
provision where, “the law of a service provider’s home country applies even when a service 
is provided in a different EU country” (“Parliament,” 2006). This contentious proposal has 
been argued as, “one of the reasons for the negative outcome of the referendum on the 
EU Constitution in May 2005” (“Parliament”, 2006) and was later replaced with, “a much 
softer ‘freedom to provide services’” (“Parliament,” 2006) clause. While the main cause 
for removing online gaming from the Services Directive relates more to arguments of the 
gambling sector’s political “sensitivity” (“Europe Excludes,” 2006), an association with the 
“country-of-origin” debate would in no way aid the status of online gaming regulation.
 Before their exemption, however, online gaming endeavors were the topic of sub-
stantial discussion in several forums. The European Ombudsman published a report in May 
of 2006, examining claims registered by European citizens of maladministration on the part 
of the Commission in adequately addressing complaints of infringement on fundamental 
rights by member states. The claims lodged assert that the German government, in both 
allowing the operation of online and traditional2 gaming monopolies by individual German 
states, or lander, as well as ordering a provider of sports betting services to cease all business 
dealings, violated Article 49 of the 1957 Treaty Establishing the European Community.3 
Article 49 sets out that signatory states agree that, “restrictions on freedom to provide ser-
vices within the Community shall be prohibited,” and in the absence of an EU directive 
further elaborating how policy towards online gaming should be structured, is governing 
law in the online gaming industry. The European Ombudsman, a creation of the 1992 
Treaty on European Union,4 is “empowered to receive complaints from any citizen of the 
Union or any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member 
State concerning instances of maladministration in the activities of the Community institu-
tions or bodies, with the exception of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance 
acting in their judicial role” (article 20d). In issuing a special report on the matter, the 
Ombudsman has taken the strongest possible action he has within his power, something 
done only thirteen times since 1995 (“Ombudsman,” 2006). The Ombudsman argues in 
his report that the Commission’s claim that common market regulation of online gaming 
services is “highly politically sensitive and controversial” (Diamandouros, 2006, p.1), does 
not, “relieve the Commission of its duty to deal properly with such complaints” (Diaman-
douros, 2006, p.1). The Ombudsman’s report was issued two weeks after the Commission 
announced a decision of formal notice on the infringement complaint. The Commission’s 
decision required several EU states to prepare reports explaining and justifying their domes-
tic policies restricting sports betting (“Free movement,” 2006), denying the Ombudsman’s 
report of much press and citizen attention, despite the significance of its release. 
 Despite the European Commission’s refusal to act at the European level to regulate 
online gambling, the body has taken a more proactive role as of late in mediating conflicts 
arising from the industry’s unique status. On April 4th, 2006, the European Commission 
issued Letters of Formal Notice to seven member states5 for having legislation dealing with 
online gambling which conflicts with Article 49 and ECJ case law on the topic. In March 
of 2007, the Commission followed up with Reasoned Opinions against Denmark, Finland 
and Hungary for not showing, in the words of the European Betting Association, “any in-
dication or willingness to reconsider their monopolistic restrictions or engage in a process 
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of constructive dialogue with other stakeholders” (“European Betting,” 2007). Special at-
tention has been placed on Germany, where there is a lander-enacted total ban on online 
lottery and sports betting, but allowed betting for horse races. The European Commission 
has threatened Germany with legal action if they do not alter their policies, stating that, “a 
proposed total ban is disproportionate and there are less restrictive measures, such as manda-
tory prior registration and strict guarantees on identification” (“EU Warns,” 2007).
With a strong division between states that clearly regulate online gambling and allow 
citizen access and states that restrict online gaming operations in an attempt to monopolize 
the market and discourage or monitor their citizens from patronizing gaming sites, indi-
vidual countries have recently made some domestic movement to rectify policy disharmony 
independent of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) rulings. Malta had previously been the 
EU pariah, advocating a model of regulation where anyone can apply for an operational 
gaming license with relatively few restrictions. Parties interested in operating online gaming 
services in Malta, for example, may do so as long as they exist as a limited liability com-
pany registered in Malta, are without a criminal record, pay the appropriate taxes and fees 
and prove that their software has not been illegally obtained (Malta Lotteries and Gaming 
Authority, 2004). This policy has often placed Maltese licensed firms in a position of un-
intentionally infringing upon the more restrictive online gaming policies of other member 
states, occasionally resulting in legal action. A recent example of this involved the French 
government, who pressed Malta-licensed online bookmaker Zeturf, Ltd. to stop accepting 
bets on French horseracing. Zeturf resisted, arguing that Pari Mutel Urbain (PMU), the 
French company Zeturf competed against, constituted an illegal monopoly. Zeturf was hit 
with substantial fines and eventually forced to close by a French court (Mangion, 2005). 
Recently, the United Kingdom, in a somewhat unexpected announcement, opted to 
move from an opaque policy to one very similar to that of Malta. The Gaming Act of 2005 
(which will enter into full effect in 2007) will regulate online gambling in the UK for the 
first time. This act will serve as a draw for tax revenues (the amount of which were not 
explicitly laid out in the bill) and as a mechanism for “protecting British punters [players], 
preventing the young and vulnerable being sucked into addiction and keeping out organised 
crime” (Wheeler, 2006). Initially met with concern from other member states with similar 
interests but less market-friendly ways of providing for them, the idea of clear regulation 
has grown more attractive. Italy followed the UK in September 2006, when it announced 
adopting a model similar to the UK, collecting a 3% tax on annual revenues of online gam-
ing providers licensed in Italy (Caldwell, 2006).
The lack of a common EU position on online gaming regulation has resulted in the 
heterogeneous array of regulatory schemes implemented on a state by state basis. This as-
sortment of policies often results in clashes between member states, both political and legal. 
When the policies of two member states come into direct conflict, it is the European Court 
of Justice that acts as referee, establishing what path is most in line with the goals and poli-
cies of the EU. Currently, a series of ECJ case rulings come closest to expressing an EU 
position on how online gambling ought to be regulated. In the 1994 Schindler case, the 
court found that lotteries, given their particular moral, religious or cultural features, were 
justifiably regulated by member governments (“Her Majesty,” 1994, para. 60). The case 
involved the importation and marketing of German lotteries through the mail to the UK, 
where such activities were heavily restricted. The ECJ held that the UK’s restrictions were 
a barrier to the free movement of services, thus classifying lotteries as a service. The ECJ did 
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not, however, classify the UK’s policy as discriminatory as all lottery providers were held to 
the same standard (“Her Majesty”, 1994, para. 48). With an understanding of the potential 
for fraud and crime to enter the situation, as well as the nature of the activity encouraging 
a player to spend money, the ECJ gave credence to the argument that the activity has the 
potential to damage the individual and society. The court decided that member states were 
permitted to restrict the cross-border promotion of lottery activities, so long as their policies 
were in accordance with the appropriate sections of the EC treaty.   
Two subsequent cases served to clarify and refine the provisions set out in the Schindler 
case. The 1999 Laara and 1999 Zanetti cases involved intermediaries of companies based 
in other EU states violating restrictive laws in another member state. In the Laara case, the 
Finnish Lotteries Act provided that games of chance could only be operated with proper 
Finnish state authorization, and then only for the collection of funds to support non-profit 
activity. Such authorization was restricted to only one operator per type of game nationally 
and as the Finnish affiliate of English slot machine operators, Mr. Laara was brought up on 
charges of operating without the proper licensing. In this instance, the ECJ held that casino 
games, as they applied to the Laraa case, were comparable to lotteries and, in keeping with 
their Schindler ruling, that the prohibition on such activities was an unjust restriction on the 
trade of services. Like the Laraaa case, the Zanetti case involved an Italian citizen operating 
bookmaking services for a British firm in Italy and faced prosecution for not holding the 
appropriate state-granted license. 
Both Laraa and Zanetti refined the idea of policy proportionality as introduced by the 
Schindler ruling. That is, a state’s policy in regulating gambling must be proportional to 
the social goals it tries to achieve. Essentially, a state can regulate remote gaming so long as 
it is not profiting from it. For example, a state can not use funds to put into their general 
budget, but funds can be used to sponsor social programs, such as community sporting clubs 
or addiction treatment programs, which are somewhat dependent on these funds (European 
Non-Governmental Sports Organization, 2006). The Anomar case, involving Portuguese 
restrictions on the use of slot machines, reaffirmed the proportionality principle and, while 
not drastically different from the holdings in the previous ECJ gaming cases, is relevant for 
illustrating constancy in ECJ rulings on acceptable gaming restrictions.  
The Gambelli case and the recent Placanica ruling are the most recent instances of the 
ECJ rulings regarding online gaming. Gambelli, an Italian citizen, was part of a network of 
Italian agencies linked by internet to the British bookmaker, Stanley International Betting 
Ltd, which held a bookmaking license from the English government. Italian law, however, 
prohibits bookmaking without a license issued by the Italian government. The Gambelli 
case again upheld the idea that regulation cannot be born out of a desire to create revenue 
for the government. The court stated,
“In so far as the authorities of a Member State incite and encourage consumers to 
participate in lotteries, games of chance and betting to the financial benefit of the 
public purse, the authorities of that State cannot invoke public order concerns relating 
to the need to reduce opportunities for that betting in order to justify measures such as 
those at issue in the main proceedings.” (Criminal proceedings, para. 69)
The Placanica case, handed down on March 6th, 2007, borrows heavily from the 
2003 Gambelli ruling in its support of cross-border, commercial gaming enterprises. Placa-
nica, also an Italian citizen, is one of three Italian operators working with the UK’s Stanley 
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Leisure, Plc., collecting bets for Stanley’s operations in Italy. Much like Gambelli, a gov-
ernment issued license is required for such activities, but this is impossible to obtain given 
limitations placed on the number of licenses offered by the Italian state. The ECJ ruled that, 
“a member state may not apply a criminal penalty for failure to complete an administrative 
formality where, in breach of Community law, such completion is refused or rendered im-
possible by that member state” (“Court Rules,” 2007). The court reaffirmed that, “moral, 
religious or cultural factors, as well as the morally and financially harmful consequences for 
the individual and for society associated with betting and gaming” are grounds for restricting 
online gaming activities, but reiterated that such restrictions must still satisfy the proportion-
ality principle previously established by ECJ rulings (O’Connor, 2007). 
In short, a state must prove public order concerns in order for such restrictions to 
persist; financial gain of the state is not sufficient to restrict the free trade of services in this 
area and the state’s ability to regulate is not absolute or merely a foregone conclusion. States 
are furthermore prohibited from promoting the patronage of online gaming services they 
operate in order to increase their financial gain. These stipulations, while clearly articulated 
in ECJ case law, have not always directly resulted in policy revision by member states. 
Online Gaming, European Institutions & Limitations of Integration Theory
Theory and theorists of European integration, while often derided as “less than con-
structive” (Puchala, 1999, p.318) with a tendency of “jumping upon one another’s at-
tributed weaknesses while disregarding one another’s insights”(Puchala, 1999, p.318), can 
provide a sold framework to assess possible explanations as to why regulation is or is not 
formulated and carried out at the EU level. The phenomenon to “jump upon” one another, 
however, leads to a divide between adherents to one school and devotees of another, limit-
ing the discussion of competing models in academic works and, in the case of online gam-
ing, prohibiting a multi-dimensional understanding of the situation at hand. 
To begin a discussion of EU theory, one must first ask why Europe is a region in the 
way it is. The obvious geographic explanations exist, although contemporary debates about 
where Europe “ends” as the European Union expands creates the need for deeper consider-
ation. In A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium, Peter Katzen-
stein asserts that the world consists of “regions organized by America’s imperium,” (2005, 
ix) a concept he defines as the “conjoining of power that has both territorial and nonterrito-
rial dimensions” (2005, 2). While his philosophical grounding is interesting, it is his con-
struction of the different ways in which this response to American imperium manifests itself 
that is most directly relevant in the case of cultural regulation. “Europe,” Katzenstein writes, 
“illustrates with particular clarity the material, formal, and political aspects of regionalism” 
(2005, p.36). In a single sentence, Katzenstein has articulated the base assumption one must 
operate from when discussing the European Union: it is a formal regionalism that must re-
main that way to exist in the world today. One could argue that this is as much a result of a 
global economy as it is any American imperium, but Katzenstein’s insight rings no less true. 
An addendum to the meta-EU discussion is the work on Regional Trade Agreements 
(RTAs) by sociologist Francesco Duina. Whereas Katzenstein describes the broader forces 
which bring states together in regional orientation, Dunia narrows the debate slightly in 
his account of RTAs as a way of regions remaining distinct in the global marketplace. In 
classifying the European Union as an “interventionist” RTA, opposed to the “minimalist” 
example of NAFTA, Duina builds an argument that “historically, most markets have formed 
slowly over time in tandem with gradual adjustments in the world views of market partici-
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pants. By contrast, the building of regional markets is a deliberate process where barriers to 
exchange are quickly removed” (2006, p.4-5). Highlighting that the creation of RTAs as an 
often rapid process intended to protect members from the pressures of the global economy 
or one another, Duina’s argument gives conflict born from EU attempts to regulate cultural 
norms a developmental context. While the peoples of Europe share some history, they are 
by no means the same and the belief that efforts to regulate closely held cultural norms 
would be accepted with no controversy is somewhat naive.   
Katzenstein and Duina both provide a conceptualization of regionalism which ac-
counts for the particular structure and legitimacy directives and ECJ rulings rest upon. 
Without the “formal” or “interventionist” approach taken by the peoples of Europe, the 
EU would not have any central control over policy and thus the tools of change under 
discussion would cease to be. Without this foundation to build upon, discussions of how 
or why the EU does or doesn’t regulate online gaming would be moot. This is a very basic 
concept but one that is important to establish when trying to apply theory to case studies, 
especially complex ones like online gaming regulation. 
With an understanding of the means by which Europeans have organized themselves, 
the EU’s component parts and their operation become highly relevant. There are many 
prominent debates in international relations and political science about the nature of regions 
and their relation to the global economy, but for the purposes of discussing EU integration 
in the context of regulating culture, the ideas of institutionalism and intergovernmentalism 
are most relevant. The institutionalist perspective on EU integration, such as that put forth 
by Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet in their compilation, European Integration and 
Supranational Governance, argues that European institutions, such as the Parliament or 
European Court of Justice, become their own masters after a period of existence and drive 
further regional integration by their actions. The EU, according to the editors, “has trans-
formed itself from a largely intergovernmental arrangement … into a supranational polity” 
(1998, p. 135). Often called “neo-functionalism,” this theory of regional development is 
rooted in the idea of “spill-over,” where integration in one area (such as the coal and steel 
industries) would promote or cause integration in others. Jean Monnet, considered to be the 
architect of the organization which the modern EU is built upon, the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC), believed that such a process was not only possible but would 
lead to peace and stability on the European continent. 
Institutionalism is generally contrasted with the concept of intergovernmentalism, as 
argued by Andrew Moravcsik in his book A Choice for Europe. Moravcsik and other inter-
governmentalists argue that while supranational EU bodies have a role in the maintenance 
of a unified Europe, the actual process of integration is only achieved when the national 
interests of independent states converge to drive it. As Moravcsik writes of the formation 
of the EU, “The integration process did not supersede or circumvent the political will of 
national leaders; it reflected their will” (p. 4). As these theories relate to the regulation of 
online gambling, the intergovernmentalist approach finds more credence than its institu-
tionalist or neo-functionalist counterparts. If institutionalism was wholly accurate, situations 
similar to that of transnational online gambling, the regulation of television broadcasting 
services via an EU-wide directive (Directive 97/36/EC), for example, would have spilled 
over and promoted regulation of remote gaming.
Mechanisms such as EU directives and ECJ rulings, the means by which the EU es-
tablishes unified policies, find special relevance in this theoretical debate. The position one 
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takes on how policy is controlled—as to whether the EU itself or member states sit in the 
driver’s seat— has direct effect on how the construction of the EU took place and how it 
best operates. An institutionalist, for example, would view the absence of an EU directive 
regulating online gaming not as a show of member state resistance to proposals, but out of a 
lack of necessity assessed by EU structures as well as potentially damaging to the status and 
legitimacy of the EU. By considering the EU itself as a self-interested rational actor, the role 
of member states is unjustifiably diminished. In contrast, an intergovernmentalist would 
view the resistance to a directive or ECJ rulings as member states expressing their political 
will, disparate as they may be, and thus determining the course of integration in that forum. 
  Approaching the regulation (or lack thereof) of online gaming from a pragmatic 
implementation angle, an examination of Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso and Thom-
as Risse’s “goodness of fit” model is helpful. The basic premise is simple: There may be a 
level of disconnect between those measures passed down from the European Union and 
what exists as law or norm in a given member state. The amount to which the policies differ 
creates a proportional amount of “adaptational pressure.” Cowles, Caporaso and Risse give 
two ways to determine the amount of adaptational pressure in a given situation.
“First, adaptational pressure might be low, and not much structural adaptation is 
required. Actors easily incorporate EU institutions and regulations in their domestic 
ways of doing things. An institution is unlikely to resist changes in its environment 
of these are consistent with its own constitutive principles… If adaptational pressures 
are very high, European institutions seriously challenge the identity, constitutive 
principles, core structures and practises of national institutions” (2001, 8)
Resistance to regulating online gaming at the EU level is often argued to be a result of 
its status as a “politically highly sensitive” (“Ombudsman”, 2006) issue. In a situation where 
the policies regulating an industry— here, online gaming— differ greatly country to coun-
try, there is a strong argument to be made that a substantial amount of adaptational pressure 
would exist for certain member states if the EU were to take action. From an institutionalist 
perspective, this would matter only in the context of possible injury done to the EU’s power 
and legitimacy. Intergovernmentalists, however, would view a policy creating any amount 
of adaptational pressure as a flag to expect resistance from member states and no movement 
in that area of regulation.     
 With theories as to EU organization addressed, it is important to also examine 
work on cultural norms and their relation to EU regulation. Those who write about the 
regulation of culture in the EU utilize a broad definition of the term, such as Paulette 
Kurzer in Markets and Moral Regulation. Kurzer’s definition of culture includes, “everyday 
socialization, beliefs, norms, institutions and common behavior in light of the challenges 
brought by European institution and market building” (2001, p.1). Kurzer’s work con-
nects the ideas of cultural change and so-called “moral regulation” in the latter’s ability to 
promote the former. As Kurzer writes, “variations in morality norms shed light on some of 
the most important aspects of state and national identity” (2000, p.1) and proceeds to assess 
“national governance of socially sensitive policies” (2001, p.1). Kurzer roots her work in in-
stitutionalist theory, however, a shortcoming that substantially limits the applicability of her 
framework. In examining only top-down, EU-to-member state change, Kurzer is unable 
to address how EU superstructures and their implements, such as ECJ rulings, are impeded 
by attempts at issuing moral regulations where cultural norms create high adaptational pres-
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sure. As Kurzer writes, “the likelihood of adopting new European standards is low unless a 
‘goodness of fit’ exists” (2001, 9). 
The interplay between broader theories of EU integration and formulation of cultural 
norms is clearly seen in discussion of remote gaming policy. Kurzer argues that market 
integration amongst EU states creates, “an ever so slight convergence of different styles of 
thought and actions,” (2001, p.ix) as a result of the “loss of national sovereignty in the cul-
tural sphere” (2001, p.ix). In Kurzer’s framework, the EU drives cultural change, although 
at a relatively measured pace. The absence of an EU directive regulating online gaming as a 
result of member state resistance, however, finds more explanation in the intergovernmen-
talist interpretation of integration practices. Kurzer’s approach is therefore able to account 
for some elements of the online gaming case, such as regulatory changes in the UK and Italy 
suggesting shifting norms, but not larger issues of disconnect between EU mechanisms and 
their ability to affect cultural norms and policy change. Under Kurzer’s model, ECJ rulings 
would have led to a shift in policy derived from a larger change in cultural norms among EU 
member states, something that has only occurred (as in the UK and Italy) when countries 
in question see a policy shift in their best interest. Kurzer constructs a black box of sorts, 
explaining the input and eventual result, but the institutionalist basis cannot support inquiry 
about the interim process of change.  
   The circumstances which surround the debate over online gaming regulation are 
an instructive tool in filling in the holes in Kurzer’s philosophical framework. In Gambling 
Politics, Patrick Pierce and Donald Miller examine “morality policy” in an attempt to study 
the politics of gambling and the resulting policies formed. Although Pierce and Miller focus 
on gambling politics in the U.S., their definitions and approach are still readily applicable in 
the European context. The authors build their analysis around the “seminal insight” (2004, 
p.4) of American political theorist Theodore Lowi that policies enacted determine the na-
ture of political conflict that will surround them. Their operational definition of “morality 
policy” is taken from work by Kenneth Meier,6 where it is defined as, “at least one advo-
cacy coalition involved in the debate defines the issue as threatening one of its core values” 
(Meier, 1999, p. 4). Pierce and Miller provide analytical tools in assessing European reac-
tions to moral policy, something that greatly overlaps with the regulation of cultural norms 
in discussions of online gaming. If a state feels that the European Union is undermining its 
ability to provide or protect the citizens of that state, resistance to those policies is inevitable. 
“Core values, first (or moral) principles, and religious values,” the authors argue, “generate a 
political dynamic very different from that generated by the details of tax policy… they gen-
erate passion and emotion rather than reason” (2004, p.32). Pierce and Miller’s analysis also 
aids in answering the larger “who cares” element of any discussion of online gaming. While 
an economically substantial industry, one can justifiably ask why online gaming regulation 
(or the absence of it) even matters. In assessing that, “morality policies occasion higher lev-
els of citizen participation than other kinds of policies” (Pierce and Miller, 2004, p.33), the 
authors present an explanation of why states do care, rooted in a less rational process than 
Kurzer and other EU integration theorists suggest. While the initiation and culmination of 
forming policy to regulate online gambling may be feasibly explained as a rational process of 
state self interest, the Pierce and Miller approach is able to account for any apparent subver-
sion of EU structures in the process.    
In Pierce and Miller’s approach, the context for arguments like access to online gam-
ing services may tear at a state’s moral fabric or threaten order is clearer. While Kurzer and 
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the institutionalists can account for the eventual results of such arguments, they are unable 
to explain the process of reaching those ends like Pierce and Miller’s work does. As a docu-
ment which must be agreed upon by EU governing bodies, a directive is subject to multiple 
levels of assessment, known as readings, where amendments are both possible and likely. In 
the present analytical framework, the process would be understood as either the EU act-
ing in a decisive capacity (institutionalist) or states jockeying for polices which most reflect 
their self interest (intergovernmentalist) without much attention to how the policy being 
discussed may itself effect the process. The exemption of online gambling from the services 
directive was a decision taken at the second reading of the proposal, similar to the “mark-
up” phase in American governance, wherein competing interests in the European Parlia-
ment can lobby for such an action. This chain of events supports the intergovernmentalist 
approach while also suggesting that the policy proposal was too divisive and, in removing a 
state’s ability to regulate online gaming as it saw fit, had too many implications for the core 
values which states center their governance philosophy around. The furor created at the 
prospect of online gaming regulated at the EU level was considerable, with groups as dispa-
rate as the World Lottery Association and EU Ministers of Sport arguing that the industry 
be left out of any services directive (“Europe excludes,” 2006; “EU sports,” 2006).     
Finally, the Advocacy Coalition framework proposed by Paul Sabatier and Hank Jen-
kins-Smith warrants its own discussion. A widely applied method of assessing the impact 
of policy analysis on policy formation, the advocacy coalition framework operates on three 
basic premises. The first premise is, “that understanding the process of policy change—and 
the role of policy-oriented learning therein—requires a time perspective of a decade or 
more” (Sabatier, 1988, p.131). The second premise contends that, “the most useful way to 
think about policy change over such a time span is through a focus on ‘policy subsystems,’ 
i.e. the interaction of actors from different institutions interested in a policy area” (Sabatier, 
1988, p.131). The third and final premise argues, “public policies (or programs) can be 
conceptualized in the same manner as belief systems, i.e. as sets of value priorities and causal 
assumptions about how to realize them” (Sabatier, 1988, p. 131). The Advocacy Coalition 
framework and its emphasis on “policy subsystems” as a source of understanding in policy 
formation adds another dimension to the study of remote gaming regulation. Looking to 
groups like the Remote Gaming Association or the EU Ministers of Sport and the absence 
of any broad coalitions therein is instructive as to the future of the debate. Without any con-
crete and coordinated policy initiatives to end conflict over online gaming, parties on both 
sides will see the issue perennially reappear. Add to that the expected exponential financial 
growth— $25 billion globally by 2010 (Shadegg, J., 2006), with Europe as the fastest grow-
ing and most lucrative market—and interested actors will have to make more coordinated 
and substantive efforts for their interests to prevail.    
 The Advocacy Coalition framework is helpful up to a point when assessing both 
the formation of policy relating to online gaming regulation as well as the impact the pro-
cess has on EU institutions. First, the framework is designed to assess policy analysis and the 
impact that has on policy formation. There has been only a single comprehensive study of 
online gaming in the EU and its overall significance, undertaken by the Swiss Institute of 
Comparative Law (SICL). The Swiss study was commissioned by the EU and completed 
and released on October 12, 2006, more than a year after the original September 2005 
release date (“Study On,” 2006). The study’s main conclusion was that, “while pursuing 
broadly similar aims the national laws and regulations vary considerably and often lead to 
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barriers to the freedom to provide services and the freedom of establishment that are in-
compatible with Community law” (European Commission, 2006). Without a long term 
time frame to reflect from and, given that the EU Services Directive was approved after this 
information was released, the questionably influence of policy analysis in the EU renders 
the Advocacy Coalition framework only moderately applicable or useful at this point in the 
study of online gaming regulation. The third premise, however, complements the work of 
Kurzer and Pierce and Miller in the context of European mechanisms of change. The lack 
of an overarching conceptualization of online gaming is an over looked but significant fact. 
The borderless nature of the internet will eventually force EU member states to either adopt 
a virtual ban on online gaming as the US has done or shift cultural norms enough to where 
policy harmonization via and EU directive is demanded by member states. In this sense, 
elements of the advocacy coalition model are both useful and predictive.  
Conclusion
The European Union represents regional integration undertaken in a very unique 
fashion. The result of a continent tiring after several hundred years of near-constant warfare, 
the EU is an important experiment in regionalism. The success of the EU may be attributed 
to any number of specific actions, individuals or policies, but the distinct structures which 
constitute the EU discussed in this paper—the European Parliament, Commission, EU 
Council of Ministers and the European Court of Justice— are now inarguably legitimate 
political entities. The debate over whether these entities are self-motivated or guided is, 
however, an area where debate still reigns. Examination of prominent literature on the sub-
ject of European integration and moral policy, coupled with the case study online gaming 
regulation provides, suggests that the intergovernmentalist approach is the most accurate in 
understanding cultural regulation in the EU. 
 The truly fascinating thing provided by the study of online gaming regulation 
in the EU, however, is not to reaffirm one integration theory or another. It is instead the 
suggestion, imbedded in the facts of the situation and the limited analysis current literature 
provides for, that a bridging of theories is more important in understanding the regulation 
of cultural norms or the implementation of so-called moral policy. The work that has been 
done up to this point on European Union regulation and its implications for cultural norms, 
namely that of Paulette Kurzer, only explains some aspects of the online gaming situation. If 
European institutions create subtle shifts in norms by decreasing protective barriers between 
member states, as Kurzer’s institutionalist perspective argues, then online gaming would be 
regulated by a services directive at this point in time. Even if one were to view the recent 
policy shifts in some EU member states as supporting Kurzer’s approach, this would still 
not explain how the policy shift actually happened, only accounting for the fact that it 
did. Using a blend of intergovernmentalism and institutionalism coupled with Kurzer’s ap-
proach to cultural change in the EU and the work of Pierce and Miller, a more complete 
picture of what keeps online gaming in a state of limbo emerges. Kurzer is right that there 
is an eventual “convergence” (2001, p.ix) of cultural norms resulting from EU integration 
and common market practices, but Pierce and Miller are able to fill in why resistance to 
an otherwise logical policy move requires that convergence. If the EU had included online 
gaming in its services directive, then the actions of the UK and Italy would support Kurzer’s 
model wholly, but online gaming was exempted from those guidelines. Real policy change 
occurred only after member states assessed that the benefits of a form of regulation in keep-
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ing with ECJ rulings outweighed any associated costs accrued therein, with policy debates 
comparing EU integration principles against the importance of maintaining core state val-
ues. Such actions support the proposal for intuitionalism and intergovernmentalism to be 
seen less as competing theories than as two sides of the same coin. 
  This synthesis of theories also best explains the interplay between EU mechanisms 
of change and cultural regulation. The dismissal of ECJ rulings by member states is obvi-
ous, necessitating inquiries from the Commission into individual state approaches to online 
gaming regulation more than a decade after the first decision was handed down. The recent 
request for reports from several EU states detailing their online gaming policies further 
highlights the shortcomings of current EU integration theory in accounting for all elements 
of cultural regulation. No EU body is willing to risk stepping on the jurisdictional “toes” 
of individual member states in the wake of the failure of the EU constitution. With the 
European Union already facing fracture, using a directive to harmonize policy may “push” 
the cultural change Kurzer speaks of, but would not be politically feasible in an atmosphere 
where states already question the centralization of authority in the EU and angle to retain 
more domestic control of policy formation. The disregard given to ECJ rulings could be 
considered a precursor to the Constitution’s rejection, with states valuing their core values 
over those set out in support of EU integration. Here, understanding the nature of debate 
surrounding moral policy, as Pierce and Miller discuss, reaffirms that a directive regulat-
ing online gaming would find greater incidence of activism against such a policy. This can 
take the form of states refusing to change policy in accordance with EU standards, as it has 
with ECJ rulings, still endangering the foundation of mutual respect which the EU is found 
upon.   
In short, the European Union has not undermined itself, but member states have 
opted to endorse diversity rather than policy unity in the case of online gaming. As a result 
of the unique space occupied by cultural issues in discussions of EU regulation, existing 
frameworks for policy and situational analysis are not sufficient to explain the case of on-
line gaming. Instances of conflict between member states in approaches to online gaming 
regulation have occasioned legal cases in both national court systems and in the European 
Court of Justice. Despite rulings from the ECJ consistent in their support for a model of 
regulation in step with the principles of the common market, no policy harmonization will 
occur until the cultural norms in member states have shifted sufficiently to allow for such 
open models of gaming regulation. Employing a synthesis of existing academic work best 
explains the nuances of cultural regulation as well as the effect these policies have on the 
operation of EU mechanisms of change. The European Union was conceived as individual 
states coming together in voluntary union and, so long as the core principles of member 
states are compromised or threatened, states will fall back on the independence enshrined in 
the documents establishing the European Union.
 
Notes
1. “Gaming” is the term preferred by the industry itself, but “online gaming” and “online 
gambling” should be considered interchangeable for the purposes of this paper. 
Many authors now prefer the term “online gambling” as to distinguish the indus-
try from online mutli-player video games, such as World of Warcraft or Starcraft.
2. “Traditional” here refers to actual physical casinos, often called “brick and mortar” op-
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erations in EU documents.
3. Full text is available http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/12002E/htm/
C_2002325EN.003301.html
4. This document is also known as the “Maastricht treaty,” for the city in the Netherlands 
it was signed in.
5. Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Hungary and Sweden
6. In this same vein, see the work of Christopher Mooney, (November 2000) “Policy De-
velopment, Social Learning and Gambling Policy in the American States.” [Paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, 
Atlanta]; (2001), “The Public Clash of Private Values” Christopher Mooney, ed., 
The Public Clash of Private Values: The Politics of Morality Policy. Chatham, NJ: 
Chatham House. 
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